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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NO. 17 606 
STEVEN L. MALAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES c. LEWIS and BRETT LEWIS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages for personal 
injuries arising out of an automobile accident wherein 
appellant was a guest. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Based upon a stipulation entered into by the 
parties, the District Court of Weber County determined 
that the defendant-respondent was entitled to a Summary 
Judgment against the plaintiffs of no cause of action on 
the plaintiff's Complaint. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent requests that the judgment 
of the District Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent disagrees with the statement of facts 
set forth in appellant's brief to some extent. Partic-
ularly, respondent disagrees with appellant's statement 
relative to the fact that the appellant will have to 
wear a leg brace for the remainder of his life, or to 
the extent of his injuries claimed. These facts, however, 
are immaterial to the issues involved in this appeal. The 
appellant acknowledges that he was a guest in the respon-
dent's vehicle and that the Guest Statute, if valid, would 
be dispositive of his claim. The only issue on appeal 
involves a constitutionality of Section 41-9-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, the Utah Automobile Guest Statute. (R.40-41). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Even though the appellant has not designated his 
argument point by point, it would appear that the argu-
ment raised in the appellant's brief is that the Utan 
Automobile Guest Statute is unconstitutional in that it 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Section 1, of the United States Constitution, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
and also the Equal Protection Provision of the Utah 
State Consitution, Article I, Section 2, and tnat it 
further violates Article I, Section 7, and Article I, 
Section 11, as well as Article I, Section 24. Appellant 
does not, however, cite this court's decision of Cannon 
v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (1974) in which basically all of 
those same arguments were made by the appellants, and 
rejected by this court. Instead, the appellant has 
relied upon the decision of the California Supreme Court, 
Brown v. Merlo, 106 Cal Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212, to ques-
tion the constitutionality of the Utah Guest Statute; 
Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated. In Brown, the 
California Supreme Court held the California Guest Stat-
ute unconstitutional as being violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the United States and the California 
Constitutions. The arguments advanced in appellant's 
brief are substantially the same as were adopted by the 
California Supreme Court. Those arguments were rejected 
by this court in the Cannon case, and have also been 
rejected by the Supreme Courts of the United States as 
well as numerous state Supreme Courts. 
In approaching the ultimate issue to be decided, 
the court should bear in mind that all presumptions 
favor the constitutionality of any legislative enactment. 
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It has been stated many times by this court that a 
statute is presumed to be constitutional unless it 
clearly violates some specific provision of the constit-
ution; that if any reasonable construction can be made 
to harmonize the statute with constitutional provisions, 
it will be so construed; that the party questioning a 
statute has the burden of proving its unconstitutionality; 
that a constitutional violation must be clear, complete 
and unmistakable; and that constitutionality of a statute 
transcends its destruction unless so obviously unreasonable 
as to have no basis for its existence. State v. Acker, 
26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; Allen v. Rampton, 23 Utah 
2d 336, 463 P.2d 7; Branch v. Salt Lake County Service 
Area #2, 23 Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 814; Norton v. Depart-
ment of Employment Security, 22 Utah 2d 24, 447 2d 907; 
Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 
2d 431, 436 P.2d 958. Thus the question presented is 
not whether it is possible to condemn the Act, but 
whether it is possible to uphold it. 
In interpreting the Constitution of the United 
States, this court cannot look to the State of California, 
but must look to tne United States Supreme Court as its 
primary authority. It is interesting to note that the 
appellant makes no mention of the United States Supreme 
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Court cases in his brief. Yet that court has spoken on 
this very issue. The leading case is Silver v. Silver, 
280 U.S. 118, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929), wherein 
the constitutionality of the Connecticut Automobile 
Guest Statute was questioned. It was argued in that 
case that the statute created an unreasonable classifi-
cation between automobile guests and other types of 
guests. In rejecting that argument, the United States 
Supreme Court held as follows: 
"The use of the automobile as an 
instrument of transportation is par-
culiarly the subject of regulation. 
We cannot assume that there are no 
evils to be corrected or permissible 
social objects to be gained by the 
present statute. We are not unaware 
of the increasing frequency of lit-
igation in which passengers carried 
gratuitously in automobiles, often 
casual guests or licensees, have sought 
the recovery of large sums for injuries 
alleged to have been due to negligent 
operation. 
. • . Whether there has been a 
serious increase in the evils of vex-
atious litigation in this class of 
cases, where the carriage is by auto-
mobile, is for legislative determination, 
and, if found, may well be the basis of 
legislative action further restricting 
the liability. Its wisdom is not the 
concern of the court. 
It is said that the vice in the 
statute is not that it distinguishes 
between the passengers who pay and those 
who do not, but between gratuitous pass-
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engers in automobiles and those in other 
classes of vehicles. But it is not so 
evident that no grounds exist for the dis-
tinction that we can say a priori that the 
classification is one forbidden as without 
basis and arbitrary. 
Granted that the liability to be imposed 
upon those who operate any kind of vehicle 
for the benefit of a mere guest or licensee 
is an appropriate subject of legislative 
restriction, there is no consitutional 
requirement that a regulation, in other 
respects permissible, must reach every class 
to which it might be applied--that the 
legislature must be held rigidly to the 
choice of regulating all or none ... In 
this day of almost universal highway trans-
portation by motorcar, we cannot say that 
abuses originating in the multiplicity 
of suits growing out of the gratuitous 
carriage of passengers in automobiles do 
not present so conspicuous an example of 
what the legislature may regard as an evil, 
as to justify legislation aimed at it, even 
though some abuses may not be hit ..• It is 
enough that the present statute strikes at 
the evil where it is felt and reaches the 
class of cases where it most frequently 
occurs." 
Thus, the Connecticut Guest Statute was upheld. 
Many years after the Silver case decision, a con-
stitutional challenge was made in the State of Illinois 
against the Illinois Guest Statute. The Illinois SuprEme 
Court held the statute to be constitutional in the case 
of Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E. 2d 229 
(1944). The decision was appealed to the United States 
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Supreme Court in Clarke v. Storchak, 332 U.S. 713, 64 s. 
Ct. 1270, 88 L.Ed. 1555 (1944). Again, the state court 
decision was affirmed. In a one sentence per curiam 
decision, the appeal was dismissed for want of a substan-
tial federal question, citing Silver v. Silver as the 
controlling authority. 
It is significant to note that since the Silver 
case, eleven states, including California, have recently 
held that Guest Statutes are not unconstitutional; Illinois, 
Texas, Iowa, Utah, Delaware, Oregon, Colorado, Nebraska, 
South Dakota, Alabama, and California. 
Since the decision in Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 
855, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212, the California 
Court sitting en bane in Schwalbe v. Jones, 128 Cal. 
Rptr. 321, 546 P.2d 1033 (1976), has held that a reenacted 
guest statute denying recovery to the owner-passenger of 
an automobile except in cases of intoxication or willful 
misconduct of the driver is not unconstitutional in deny-
ing equal protection of the law. In this case, the Cal-
ifornia Court held that in making a distinction between 
owner-passengers and non-owner-passengers the legislature 
may take into consideration the fact that the owner 
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generally has the right to direct and control the driver 
and as such there is a reasonable basis for the distinction. 
As a practical matter, an owner sitting as a pass-
enger probably can exercise no right of control in most 
accident situations. Accidents simply occur too quickly 
to allow an exercise of a right of control. In reality, 
it seems that the California Court has awakened to the 
idea that it could not substitute its wisdom for the 
wisdom of the legislature in determining whether a law 
is or is not desirable. The Schwalbe court said: 
Plaintiffs, in order to sustain their 
position that Section 17158 denies them 
equal protection of the laws, must not 
be content to argue that the above reason-
ing was unwise, or that the purpose of 
the Legislature could have been better 
furthered by another means. Nor is it 
enough for them to show that the law-
makers, in addressing similar problems 
in similar areas, have made dissimilar 
judgments. The burden cast upon them is 
that of demonstrating that the means 
chosen by the Legislature were irrational 
or that the purpose which they furthered 
was not a legitimate legislative concern. 
This they have not done. As the foregoing 
analysis indicates, the Legislature, pur-
suing the clearly legitimate goal of 
achieving a fair distribution of liability 
for damage caused by unreasonable conduct, 
concluded that the owner of a motor veh-
icle, whether he drives it himself or 
selects another to act as his chauffeur, 
should not recover for injuries sustained 
by him due to the negligent operation of 
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that vehicle--especially in light of the 
fact that in the case of the surrogate 
driver any such recovery would be at the 
expense of the driver. We may disagree 
with this conclusion, but we cannot brand 
it as beyond the pale of reason. To do 
so would be to seriously erode our con-
stitutional function. We conclude there-
fore that the motion for nonsuit on the 
negligence count was properly granted. 
Since an owner-passenger furnishes his car, 
there is an excellent argument that he gives compen-
sation and is in fact a passenger for hire. Is it 
reasonable to do as California has done and say that 
owner-passengers cannot recover and that gratuitous 
guests can? Should a court substitute its wisdom for 
that of the legislature, as California has done, or 
should it not? 
A number of law review articles, American Law 
Report Annotations, and cases from other states are 
cited in support of the appellant's proposition. However, 
the appellant fails to cite the Utah Supreme Court 
decision of Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (1974), in 
which the exact same constitutional arguments relied 
upon by the appellant were raised and fully argued in 
the consolidated cases decided under the Cannon decision. 
This court framed the issues involved in the Cannon 
case in the first paragraph of its decision where the 
factual and legal circumstances were stated as follows: 
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"The appeals of the plaintiffs, 
which arose out of separate and 
unrelated actions, have been consol-
idated since they involve one common 
question of law, namely, was Section 
41-9-11, U.C.A. 1953, unconstitutional? 
Each plaintiff, while a guest in a motor 
vehicle, moving upon a public highway 
in this state, sustained personal injuries 
in a vehicular accident. Each plaintiff 
initiated an action against his host, 
the driver of the vehicle, to recover 
damages for the negligent operation of 
the vehicle. Each host asserted Section 
41-9-11, U.C.A. 1953, as a defense and 
denied liability. Each plaintiff urged 
unsuccessfully before the trial court 
that the Guest Statute, 41-9-11, U.C.A. 
1953, denied him equal protection of the 
law under the Constitution of the United 
States (Fourteenth Amendment), and the 
Constitution of Utah (Article I Section 24) ." 
A reading of the appellant's brief, even though 
the arguments are not set out point by point, makes 
it abundantly clear that the gravamen of the plaintiff's 
attack on the Guest Statute is exactly the same as tne 
gravamen of the attack of the Guest Statute in Cannon. 
The constitutional attack under both the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of Utah is the same in 
this case as it was in the Cannon case. 
This court, in rejecting the various arguments 
raised in the Brown case, and refusing to adopt the law 
of the Brown case, pointed out, in Cannon, that while 
the California court in the Brown case found as an 
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aspect of irrationality of the statutory classification 
that numerous statutory exceptions had rendered recovery 
under the Guest Statute largely fortuitous in view of 
the various circumstances in which the statute was not 
applicable, such a problem did not exist with regard to 
the Utah Statute. Furthermore, this court said, the 
Equal Protection Clause does not compel the State to 
either attack every aspect of the problem or to refrain 
from any action at all, but, instead, it is sufficient 
that the State's action be rationally based and free 
from invidious discrimination. The law of the case 
adopted in Cannon, which is still the law of the State 
of Utah, can be readily defined in two short paragraphs 
found on pages 888 and 889 of the decision, respectively, 
where it is stated: 
"Section 49-9-11, U.C.A. 1953, was 
enacted to provide some protection to a 
generous host, who is sued by his invited 
guest for ordinary negligence, when the 
rider has given no compensation as an 
inducement for making the trip or furnish-
ing the carriage for the rider. This act 
subserved a valid legislative purpose to 
encourage hospitality in the use of the 
public highways. Furthermore, the auto-
mobile guest in this jurisdiction is not 
placed in a distinct classification, where 
he alone as a recipient of generosity is 
deprived of the duty of due care by his 
host." 
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"The interpretation of the Guest 
Statute by this court has averted the 
alleged irrationality in the statutory 
classification which disturbed the court 
in Brown v. Merlo. Furthermore, the Equal 
Protection Clause does not compel the 
state to attack every aspect of a problem 
or to refrain from any action at all; it 
is sufficient that the State's action be 
rationally based and free from invidious 
discrimination." 
Equal Protection, of course, requires that class-
ifications be reasonable and not arbitrary, and have a 
fair and substantial relation to the object of the leg-
islation. There must be a rational basis for the class-
ification. The Utah Statute does not purport to single 
out any particular group or give any special treatment 
to anyone. It applies to all operators of motor vehicles 
and their guests. None are excluded. All persons who 
ride as guests in such vehicles are precluded from 
recovering from injury, death, or loss caused by the 
driver's ordinary negligence. All people who accept 
transportation in a motor vehicle as guests without pay-
ment are included. 
Appellant has suggested that the purpose of the 
Guest Statute is to protect hospitality and to prevent 
collusive lawsuits. These objectives, although belittled 
by the appellant, have been considered proper by the 
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tribunal of our land as well as by numerous state Supreme 
Courts as previously cited, including the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah. It must also be noted that the 
protection of hospitality is not limited to the automobile 
guest. This same principle has traditionally run through 
many fields of law; for example, the gratuitous bailee 
and the bailee for hire, the common carrier and private 
carrier, the inkeeper and the ordinary host, and the tres-
passor and the business invitee. The protection of 
hospitality has been ingrained into our legal system. 
As stated in the case of Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 
371, 143 A. 240, 
"There is inherent justice in the 
requirement that one who undertakes to 
perform a duty gratuitously should not 
be under the same measure of obligation 
as one who enters upon the same under-
taking for pay." 
Nor is it unusual for the legislature to pass 
special legislation applicable only to automobiles. The 
automobile itself provides a basis for classification. 
Examples of such legislation not applicable to other 
fields of tort law are laws that make the owner of a 
vehicle responsible for the negligence of minors (41-2-22, 
Utah Code Annotated); laws imposing requirements for 
driving automobiles (41-2-1, et seq. Operator's and 
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Chauffeur's Act); and special laws providing for the 
service of process upon non-resident motorists (41-12-8, 
Utah Code Annotated). Would appellant claim all such 
laws to be discriminatory because they relate only to 
automobiles? Automobile guests typically enter voluntarily 
and remain for relatively brief periods of time. The auto-
mobile statutes do not discriminate invidiously against 
any permanent, identifiable group of persons. They apply 
equally to all persons who are guests in automobiles. 
While it is believed that the foregoing authorities and 
argument have covered all aspects of the appellant's 
attack, the appellant has made the same argument under 
other unspecified sub-headings to the effect that the 
Guest Statute violates the Uniform Operation Provisions 
of the Utah State Constitution, and also violates the 
constitutional section providing that all courts shall 
be open and that every man shall have a remedy by due 
course of law for injury done to him in his property, 
person, or reputation. In addressing those arguments 
the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Behrens v. Burke, 
229 N.W. 2d 86 (1975) states as follows: 
"Nor does this statute violate 
the due process guarantee of Article IV, 
Section 2. That clause, we believe, 
is applicable to the facts before us 
only so far as it grants every person 
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the right to a hearing on his 
inclusion in the class affected 
by the statute. Article IV, 
Section 20, is inapplicable since 
"it is a guarantee that 'for such 
wrongs as are recognized by the 
law of the land the court shall 
be opened and afford a remedy.'" 
Simons v. Kidd, 1949, 73 s.o. 41, 
38 N.W. 2d 883. The guest statute 
declares that injury suffered by a 
guest because of a host's negligence 
are not caused by 'wrongs as are 
recognized by the law of the land.'" 
In essence, then, the court is saying that the 
constitutional provision guaranteeing that the courts 
will be open to every person for all injury done to him 
does not give a cause of action for negligence to a 
guest, but only such causes of action as other guests 
would have. The Guest Statute does not preclude a cause 
of action for injury to a guest. It merely changes the 
nature of proof required to support a cause of action. 
In Behrens, the court said a statute should not be 
declared unconstitutional unless the infringement on 
constitutional rights leaves no reasonable doubt. The 
court then said, 
"* * * We believe the class-
ification and the effect of the 
statute are reasonably geared to 
these purposes. We cannot believe 
that the Guest Statute can never 
act as an incentive to free trans-
portation; we cannot believe that 
the Guest Statute does not prevent 
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recovery in lawsuits that could 
be characterized as ungrateful; 
nor do we believe we are entitled 
to question the wisdom of the 
substative legislative decision 
that those who do not compensate 
their host drivers are not to 
receive the protection of the 
negligence standard. We hold the 
South Dakota Guest Statute does 
not violate Article IV, Section 18." 
The same issues raised in the Cannon case have 
been before this court on two subsequent occasions in 
Thomas v. Union Pacific RR Company, (Utah) 548 P.2d 621 
(1976), and Critchley v. Vance, (Utah) 575 P.2d 187 
(1978). Not only did this court expressly reject the 
constitutional arguments raised by the appellants in 
this case, it has on those two subsequent occasions 
reaffirmed that position, and refused to change its 
ruling relative to the constitutionality of the Guest 
Statute. This court made it clear in the Thomas case 
and the Critchley case that the re-examination of the 
act should be left to the legislature. For the reasons 
stated in those cases, as well as others cited in this 
brief, it is respectfully submitted that if the Guest 
Statute is to be repealed that the act of repealing it 
must be left to the legislature of the State of Utah, 
and that this court should not retreat from the position 
heretofore announced in Cannon, Thomas, and Critchley. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Guest Statute is not unconstitutional under 
the Constitution of the State of Utah or of the Constit-
ution of the United States. The appellant's attack of 
the constitutionality of the Utah Guest Statute should 
not be considered in view of the recent consideration of 
this question by this court in Cannon v. Oviatt, supra, 
Thomas v. Union Pacific Railroad, supra, and Critchley 
v. Vance, supra. 
DATED this -~1 ~St=h day of ___ __,,,J._.u ... l...,'j,__ _ , 19 8 l • 
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